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REVIEW ESSAY 
Critique in Truth: Bernard Harcourt’s Critique & Praxis 
Bernard Harcourt, Critique & Praxis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020. Pp. 
696. ISBN: 9780231195720 (hardback). 
Bernard Harcourt’s recent book is hefty. Its width catches the eye when shelved alongside 
the thin volumes that have become too customary in contemporary academic publishing 
(some of them a mere 125 pages). Critique & Praxis measures in at nearly 540 pages of text 
plus an additional 100 pages of back matter. But its heftiness is more a matter of the phil-
osophical density and majesty that Harcourt brings to his subject: the possibilities for the 
practice of critical theory today. 
This is a book that, by its intellectual intensity, if not also by its length, resists the sum-
mary style typical of the genre of a review. Rather than attempting to tie together all of 
the many threads of the book, I shall instead here attempt to articulate the frame within 
which the book’s core arguments are placed. 
In the book’s introductory sections (consisting of two brief essays comprising about 50 
pages) Harcourt establishes a pair of distinctions. These distinctions organize everything 
that follows. 
The first distinction is between philosophy as contemplative thought and philosophy 
as a form of active engagement. Harcourt does not draw this distinction in exactly those 
terms (nor, for instance, in the terms offered by Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition 
with her reference to the vita contemplativa and the vita activa).1 He offers a series of con-
trasts—between theoria and praxis (8), contemplation and practice (8), a “refuge in episte-
mology” and “chang[ing] the world” (9), and so on. All of these refer back to a basic dis-
tinction between a contemplative style in philosophy and active philosophical engage-
ment. The canonical lodestone for this distinction is also the first quotation in the book—
Karl Marx’s famous quip about philosophers who “only” interpret the world but fail to 
engage in changing it (1). Placing himself in agreement with Marx (though not quite in 
 
1 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958). 
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line with all the derision that Marx’s “only” implies), Harcourt argues in favor of, to quote 
the book’s first sentence, an “ambition” for a critical philosophy that would “transform 
human existence” (1). 
Harcourt’s second central distinction is also noted in the book’s first sentence, where 
he ties his transformative ambition specifically to what he calls “critical philosophy” (1). 
The contrast here, as laid out in the book’s second sentence, is to the philosophies of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Smith. The central contrast for critical philosophy is liberal political 
theory. But the liberal alternative to truly critical philosophy is not merely dismissed. Har-
court registers the active thrust of liberalism as expressed by the “vocal resistance of lib-
eral critics and organizations” such as the ACLU or Human Rights Watch (11). Liberalism 
makes use of “the courts and liberal institutions” (12) to advance its agenda items of lib-
erty, property, and (only-rough) equality. By contrast to this agenda, the critical philoso-
phy that Harcourt identifies with Marx, Rousseau, Horkheimer, Foucault, Spivak, and 
others is one that tactically advances the core values of “emancipation” and “liberation” 
(1). (I note only in passing that it is ironic to read of these particular values as connected 
to Foucault. There is deep suspicion in the first volume of The History of Sexuality toward 
the idea that our liberation is always what we can simply assume to be hanging in the 
balance.2 Yet Harcourt here reproduces this assumption, which is so widespread in con-
temporary critical theory today that hardly anyone even bothers to defend it. Yet what of 
Foucault’s central argument that liberation is hardly adequate as tactical resistance to, say, 
disciplinary strategies which we inculcate in ourselves?) 
Harcourt’s two distinctions, if put into schematic combination, allow four possible po-
sitions. The first is contemplative liberalism (which could be exemplified for Harcourt’s 
purposes by John Rawls’s own self-described “ideal theory,” or even better by Rawlsiana, 
that is, the thousands of scholarly articles about Rawls). The second option is contempla-
tive critical theory (exemplified for Harcourt by Axel Honneth’s 2017 The Idea of Socialism). 
The third option is activist liberalism, which Harcourt identifies primarily with liberal 
organizations (such as ACLU, though Harcourt might also have referred to the work of 
some liberal political theorists, such as those in the vein of Amartya Sen and Martha Nuss-
baum). The fourth option would be an activist, or praxis-centered, critical philosophy. Set 
in this schema, the basic argumentative intervention of the book is clear. Harcourt barely 
considers the first option as a serious contender; his central concern is with the unresolv-
able contest between the assertedly-failed positions of the second and third options; and 
he argues for a fulsome form of the fourth option. 
Does critical philosophy today actually militate for the achievement of its political goals 
in the world? Harcourt worries that it does not; at least not often enough: “The critical 
Left, as opposed to the liberal Left, appears disarmed” (11). Critical philosophy has taken 
refuge in epistemology, speculation, and contemplation. By contrast, Harcourt argues in 
 
2 Michel Foucault, The Will to Know (The History of Sexuality Volume 1) [1976] (1978), 159.  
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favor of a philosophy that is both critical in content and at the same time takes the form 
of praxis. Hence his titular ambition: Critique & Praxis. 
There are three reactions I suspect a reader might have to this basic framing. One reac-
tion would be to worry about the overly-rigid contrasts presumed by the book. Why such 
distance between theory and practice? Why such a stark contrast between liberal political 
theory and the ambitions of a critical philosophy that aims to “infuse the world with the 
values of compassion, equality, solidarity, autonomy, and social justice” (1)? Is critical 
philosophy really so steadfastly opposed to core liberal values for balancing equality and 
autonomy or core liberal strategies like rights? Consider, for instance, how Foucault felt 
free to make use of liberal rights as means for advancing viable political resistance.3 
A second reaction would be to worry about how Harcourt has framed the book in a 
way that raises a dogging question of priorities. Consider that Harcourt argues on behalf 
of a philosophy of both active political militancy and radical theoretical critique. But 
which of these values is higher for Harcourt where they come into conflict? It is a contem-
plative luxury to not have to answer that question. But in the exigencies of actual political 
reality, which Harcourt himself knows as an extremely-active lawyer (cf. 466-468), this is 
a question that cannot always be deferred. If Harcourt’s deepest priorities truly lie with 
activist philosophy, then why all the fretting over liberalism, given the enormous amount 
of good that can be done by making use of liberal strategies and institutions? Everyone 
knows that liberalism is strikingly imperfect, but in contexts like that in the U.S. today 
where basic liberal goods like voting rights are being dismantled, there is obviously enor-
mous good to be done by the liberal activist who achieves a fairer franchise without sac-
rificing said gains to a fully perfect justice.4 What this suggests is that Harcourt’s deepest 
priorities lie with critical philosophy. Indeed this has to be true, at least with respect to 
this book (which is published by a university press, written in academic prose, and as-
sumes a reader who can sail through casual references to a bibliography of thinkers who 
will be familiar only to the graduate students and professoriate in the theoretical human-
ities and social sciences). Harcourt’s primary argumentative foil is therefore not really the 
liberal activist (who is actually Harcourt himself in other work beyond the confines of this 
book) but rather the unengaged critical theorist (cf. 535) who long ago lost themselves in 
their “epistemological detour” (4, 157, 221, 318). 
I have posed the first two reactions to Harcourt’s framing as worries. The third reaction 
begins by not being overly-worried about such matters. A reader can grant that Harcourt’s 
organizing distinctions need not be stark dichotomies but can be wielded as modest heu-
ristic organizers. A reader can also accept that Harcourt’s implicit prioritization of philo-
sophical critique over political praxis need not be taken as harboring some secret inner 
ambition which undoes the whole project. Such a reader can thereby learn from this book 
everything it has to offer (and there is much). For such a reader is in a good position to 
follow the thread of Harcourt’s argument concerning how critical philosophy has in 
 
3 The fullest discussion of Foucault and rights is Ben Golder, Foucault and the Politics of Rights (2015). 
4 For an impressive contemporary example of activist liberalism about voting rights see Stacey Abrams, Our 
Time is Now (2020). 
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recent decades become mired in a contemplative style such that what it really needs today 
is to refocus its energies on a praxis that could be the tactical equal to liberalism’s activ-
isms. 
What, then, of Harcourt’s interventions on behalf of a praxis of critique? How successful 
is the book’s argument in its own central terms? Here especially the book resists the style 
of summary that a review demands. I shall here offer an only-partial preview of some of 
the most important interventions that Critique & Praxis develops. 
Of greatest importance, because the stakes here are highest, is Harcourt’s discussion of 
the problem of truth in contemporary critical theory’s challenge of navigating between 
the Scylla of foundationalism and the Charybdis of denormativization (177ff., 221ff.). I 
myself regard this as the central challenge facing political theory today. By framing this 
challenge in terms of truth, Harcourt offers a novel bid. It comes in two steps. First is his 
argument that critical theory must avoid “the imposition of a foundation” (184) that is 
already internal to any act of “claiming truth” (184). Second is Harcourt’s proposal to re-
place reliance on truth with a “juridical model” of judgment that involves a “temporary 
assessment of the evidence and arguments” available to those involved (187). Think of 
critique less on the model of the intellectual who simply assumes a universal audience 
(which they never have anyway), and more on a workmanship model expressed by the 
litigator who in specific contexts, with great effort and preparation, wins their arguments. 
Harcourt’s juridical model resonates with an image he offers later in the book when he 
discusses the relationship between theory and praxis exhibited in Foucault’s work in the 
early 1970s. This is when Foucault was shuttling between his manuscript for Surveillir et 
punir and his involvement with the Groupe d’Information sur les prisons (439-445). The 
model Harcourt detects here is one of theory and praxis in “confrontation” and “collision” 
(439). This image is more forceful than that famous metaphor upon which many of us 
have relied, namely Deleuze’s reference to theory as a “toolbox” in his 1972 dialogue with 
Foucault.5 The workmanlike advocate who deploys Harcourt’s juridical model is not (or 
at least not only) using theory as a toolkit but is confronting the praxis of their concrete 
situation with the praxis of a concretizing theory. 
The crucial question facing this proposal to resolve the crucial challenge is this: does 
Harcourt’s proposed bid of a juridical model resolve the impasse between foundationalist 
pretense and normative abstinence? My own hunch is that Harcourt concedes too much 
to the relativist (he himself worries about this [188, 569n71]). Yet the perspective itself is 
promising. It could be amplified if given greater specificity via, for example, a genealogy 
of truth that would not reject claims to truth so much as situate them in their practices. 
Such an approach could build on Harcourt’s own rereading of Foucault as a genealo-
gist of truth-telling. In an early chapter, Harcourt rereads the arc of Foucault’s work from 
1970 to 1984 through the lens of the category, prominent in his 1981 Louvain lectures, of 
truth-telling. Foucault’s work offers “a history of truth itself” (110). This lens is deployed 
 
5 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power” in Desert Islands, ed. Gilles Deleuze [1972] 
(2004), 208.  
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for a delicate revisioning of Foucault’s lectures and books across these years (111-121). 
The interpretive insight here is, as any reader of Harcourt’s prior scholarship on Foucault 
will expect, masterful. The value of such genealogies, especially as we are able to extend 
them deeper into our own present today, is in how they enable us to confront, or “coun-
ter” in Harcourt’s felicitous phrase (191-202), the truths of our present.6 
A different option for fleshing out contemporary genealogies of truth-telling is worth 
mentioning if only because it does not appear as such within Harcourt’s book and yet is 
in fact not far from its orbit. This would be to build out the work of another genealogist. 
In Truth & Truthfulness, Bernard Williams fleshes out a minimalist disquotational theory 
of truth through a genealogy of sincerity and accuracy as contingent virtues of truthful-
ness.7 Such an approach enables us to grasp how truth, as internal to practices of truthful-
ness, is sometimes that which we all need in order to be able to rely on one another. 
We should readily admit that both Foucault’s and Williams’s genealogies of truth-tell-
ing remain incompletely developed in their work. But if further built out by today’s (and 
tomorrow’s) critical philosophers, they could help resituate truth-claiming outside of the 
impasse between foundationalism and relativism. One crucial clue to any such genealogy 
of truth formations, and one which Harcourt himself already endorses in outline (261-
266), would be the kind of contextualism advocated by Amy Allen’s critical-theoretical 
uptake of metaethical contextualism.8 Allen’s argument holds that one can reject second-
order metaethical universalism and foundationalism without abandoning first-order nor-
mative commitment. This argument helps us glimpse the potential gains of both genea-
logically investigating the contexts of emergence for what is true and at the same time 
affirming that, within a context, truth is truth. This is precisely where critical theory can 
reap the greatest insights from its contemporary tendencies toward contextualism (or, 
better yet, pragmatism, for that is what is really at stake here).9 This is the endpoint toward 
 
6 I register in passing a methodological misfit between Harcourt’s desideratum of counter critique and his 
claim that genealogy is primarily funded by a theory of knowledge-power according to which knowledge is 
“inextricably” (95) tied to power. Harcourt claims that since “that theory is what fuels his method” Foucault’s 
genealogy is really “knowledge-power genealogy” (92), rather than, at least primarily, “problematizating” 
or “possibilizing” genealogy (92, 555n81). But I more clearly see how problematizing genealogy sets us up 
to “counter” the truths of the present than does knowledge-power genealogy, unless it is simply assumed 
that the imbrication of knowledge and power is always a bad thing and never to be vindicated. Such an 
assumption is (and for Foucauldian reasons) unwarranted. 
7 Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (2002). 
8 Amy Allen, The End of Progress (2016), 204-219. 
9 Pragmatism (and such of its key commitments as contextualism) is already implicit across a wide swath of 
contemporary critical theory, and yet is unfortunately underdiscussed in anglophone critical theory. The 
current theorist who most fully acknowledges pragmatism’s importance is Rahel Jaeggi, Critique of Forms of 
Life [2014] (2018). Jaeggi, however, ultimately distances her view from pragmatism in subsuming Dewey’s 
concept of “problems” (Ch.4) under Hegel’s concept of “contradiction” (Ch. 9). Jaeggi is aware of this dis-
tancing, but I would argue that it is far greater than she takes it to be. For a focused critique of the impover-
ished notion of contradiction (as featured in Hegel) vis-à-vis the critically-potent concept of problems (as it 
resonates from Foucault and Deleuze across to Dewey and James) see my discussion in Colin Koopman, 
“Critical Problematization in Foucault and Deleuze: The Force of Critique without Judgment” in Between 
Deleuze and Foucault, ed. Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel Smith (2016), esp. 94-99. 
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which Harcourt is headed, though the way there gets lost in talk of turning away from 
truth altogether. 
To return to the central question of the book, then, what genealogies of truth formation 
can clarify are the fields of practice upon which critique may be enacted as praxis. To get 
a sense of how this already looks through Harcourt’s vision, consider lastly the final sec-
tion of Critique & Praxis. 
The end of Critique & Praxis proposes to reframe the normative question of “What is to be 
done?” in terms of the more personal question of “What more am I to do?” (448). Any 
reader impressed by Foucault’s skepticism toward the great modern technique of the con-
fessional may balk at aspects of Harcourt’s discussion here. There can be no denying that 
the end of the book is all caught up in the memoir style in which our contemporary culture 
is suffused. But is our memoir moment not only simultaneous with the decay of democ-
racy but also part of the same contemporary configuration? If critical theory expresses 
itself through an account of personal action, does it risk forfeiting its political claims pre-
cisely by being located in a personal space where it feels inappropriate to demand public 
justifications? Is an interrogation of one’s unique experience the endgame that is due the 
critical theorist who readily quits claiming truth? 
Such questions admit of no easy answer. We all know by now that the personal can be, 
and indeed sometimes must be countenanced as, political. But we can also know the dif-
ference between an account of one’s personal activity in public matters and a conversation 
with oneself that is private in the sense that it is not offered as a justification to anybody 
other than oneself. The final part of Harcourt’s book moves back and forth between these 
two quite different modes. This sort of ambivalent shuffling may seem the fate of any 
attempt to excavate the political from the personal. But it is not. There are some, though 
admittedly only a very important few, writers who manage to convey the politics in per-
sonal experience without it somehow retreating toward the private. James Baldwin comes 
to mind as one shining example—in his essay “Nothing Personal” he is intensely personal 
and yet there is not once even the slightest suggestion of it all being somehow, quite in-
credibly, private.10 A more contemporary writer in whom we find something quite similar 
is Jesmyn Ward—her heartbreaking memoir Men We Reaped is fully situated within the 
uniqueness of her particular life in such a way as to make it plain to see the politics of all 
the dying she has been living against.11 It would not be fair to expect Harcourt’s prose to 
live up to the breathtaking beauty and arresting tragedy of a Baldwin or a Ward, and yet 
at the same time it is of course eminently appropriate to compare Harcourt’s more per-
sonal approach to political questions with those who define for us today the very necessity 
of such public letters. 
The many interventions made by Critique & Praxis, and I have here merely glossed only a 
few of them, all possess two striking qualities. First, they are interventions into crucial 
 
10 James Baldwin, “Nothing Personal,” Contributions in Black Studies 6:1 [1964] (2008), online publication. 
11 Jesmyn Ward, Men We Reaped: A Memoir (2013). 
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arguments for contemporary critical theory. Second, Harcourt intervenes into these cru-
cial matters in a way that is capacious and compelling. Not all readers will agree with all 
of Harcourt’s interventions. I have made it clear that I do not myself unambiguously ac-
cept all of them. But Harcourt is clearly worth disagreeing with over matters where the 
stakes could hardly be greater. And worthy disagreement is what one must always ask 
from philosophy (this is one way in which political philosophy and politics are two dis-
tinct activities). Registered thus, Critique & Praxis is one of the most provoking contribu-
tions to critical theory of the twenty-first century. 
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